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Abstract 
During the second half of the 1980's， both Paris and Tokyo have experienced a huge 
increase of the urban land prices (the socalled“land b凶 ble"). This phenomenon showed 
similar features in both capital cities : itwas generated by the deregulation process of the 
financial markets and the development of the service sector. In addition， the deregulation 
of planning and construction rules， the tax incentives to buy and keep real叩estateassets， 
and the myth of land scarcity have helped the land prices to rise in both countries. 
Despite the emergency countermeasures adopted by the Japanese and French govern-
ments two years after the land boom started， the speculation process lasted until the end 
of the 1980's. The public authorities had than to react more efficiently : in1990 and 1991， 
more drastic reforms concerning the tax system and the planning rules were adopted. But 
this measures intervened while the real-estate markets were registering a severe 
slow-down in Paris and Tokyo. The present market's slump and the strong pressure of the 
real-estate and construction companies to deregulate the land tax system and the planning 
rules are entraving the efficiency of a long term policy to regulate the land and. property 
markets. 
Introduction 
During the second half of the 1980's， several metropolis in European， American and Asian 
countries have experienced a huge increase of urban land prices. This phenomenon has ended 4 or 
5 years later with a drop of prices， causing a general economic slow down in some countries. Such 
was the case of France and Japan， where the land markets can be parallelled. We will thus try， in 
this paper， tocompare both cases of Paris and Tokyo. Such a comparison has to be done carefully， 
because of the scale's difference between France and ]apan (in economy， population...)， and also be-
cause each country has its specific economic framework and agents. Nevertheless it is interesting to 
analyse the comparative trends on the land markets and the governmental strategy of both countries 
towards the so-called “land bubble"l. 
From 1985 to 1989， the average price of commercial land (used for office space) increased 
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threefold in the 20 wards of Paris (from 6900 FF/sqm to 22600 F/sqm， that is 126400 yens/sqm 
to 414000 yens/sqm)， and went up. 2.7 times in Tokyo's 23 wards (from 3.3 to 8.9 million 
yens/sqm). In the most attractive areas， the increase was far more important : 15 times in the west 
of Paris (up to 106000 FF/sqm， 1.9 miIion yens/sqm) and about ten times in the five central 
wards of Tokyo within ten years (up to 19.26 million yens in 1991 in Chuo ward) . Yet the 
]apanese land prices remained on average 14 times higher than those observed in France. 
Despite this huge difference， this phenomenon has had some similar features in both cities: 
ーItfirst concentrated in a narrow area (the 3 central wards in Tokyo， downtown and west of 
Paris) ， then spread to the c∞ont耶
kets in the suburbs of the two capi此ta叫Icities. 
-a gap has progressively appeared between land and stock prices on one side， and the econo-
mic “fundamentals" on the other side. As for Tokyo， the nominal GDP， the consumer price and the 
wage index increased respectively and 1.2. 1_ 04 and 1.1 times from 1986 to 1989 (fig.2). While in 
Paris， during the same period， the GDP increased 1.2 times and the inflation rate even decreased 
(see fig.1) . 
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1 The economic theory gives no unique definition of a “bubble". Some economists do not even agree with the existence 
of such a phenomenon. We propose to take the definition given by the ] apanese Research Committee of Fiscal and 
Monetary Policy， inits oficial report issued in April 1993，“The Mechanism and Economic Effects of Asset Price 
Fluctuations'¥(Japanese Ministry of Finance. see footnote 22) :“bubble(is) r，ψrring to a deviation between actual and theore-
tical asset pricesド・ 01such mα:gnitude that it h酎 animpact on the livelihoods qf maTl)' people and interferes即itha nation's normal eco-
n叩micmanagement". 
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Fig.2. The Japanese bubble(1980=100) 
The rental office market followed a similar path. The office rents did not increase as much as 
the land prices. This was particularly true in Tokyo， where the average office rent in the business 
areas was 20 724 yens/ sqm/ month， whereas the figure for Paris was 7 293 yens/ sqm/ month， with 
land prices 14 times lower2 (it must be noted that the building height in Paris is higher than in 
Tokyo : 5.5 stories against 2.43) . As a result， the profitability of the office investment has dropped 
in both cases : a yield of 4% only in the prime locations of Paris4， and a yield frequently below 1% 
in Tokyo. 
Along this framework， one question needs to be answered for both cities : how could such an 
anomalous phenomenon happen? To give an answer， we must reconsider the events of the 1980's. 
The rise of land and stock prices 
1n the early 1980's， after recovering the oil shocks of the 1970's， the economy has been affected 
by deep adjustments in the major developed countries. This new tendency was characterised by the 
development of the service sector and the globalisation of the financial markets. 
2 NOGUCHI Y.， IGARASHI T.， 1990， NiPpon tochijihO 90， Local Authorities Research Center， Tokyo， p.97. 
3 OT ANI Sachio， 1989， Toshi ni tote削如chi附加nika， Tokyo : Chikuma Shobo， p.78. 
4 Auguste THOUARD， 1990， Le marche de l'immohilier d'entreprise， tome I，p. 26. 
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This tendency led to a progressive deregulation of the financial markets in both countries. It 
started in Japan in 1980 (new act on currency and foreign business， followed in 1984 by the 
Baker-Takeshita agreement) and it took its biggest step in 1985 with the “Plaza agreement" (which 
led to the “stro時 yen"period). This process was followed by a rapid growth of the Tokyo's stock 
market ; infive years， the secondrange Tokyo stock-exchange office became one of the first in the 
world financial markets. As for France， credit controls were removed in 1987， but the development 
of the financial markets took place at a slower pace. 
The stock-market boom and the development of the service sector attracted an increasing num-
ber of tertiary companies to both Paris and Tokyo. Thus， the demand for office space grew stron-
ger， firstly in prime locations (companies willing to establish their headquarters in the vicinity of 
the business zones) ， then to the adjacent areas. The strong centralisation of both countries explains 
why this boom in the demand was first limited to Paris and Tokyo regions. 
Meanwhile， the central government started to lower the interest rates in }apan (cf. fig.4). The 
main target was to avoid the negative effects of the strong currency (et的知) by increasing the 
Japanes巴investmentsabroad and providing the manufacturing sector with a flexible monetary poli-
cy. Within 17 months (December 1985-May 1987)， the official discount rate was lowered from 5% 
to 2.5%， and the prime rate decreased accordingly from 7.2% to 4.9%. This monetary policy helped 
the companies to develop firm's investments -and to cope with endaka as early as 1987-. However， 
this credit was rapidly channelled into real-estate markets (investment or speculation) . Driven by 
a strong competition due to the deregulation framework， banks aggressively entered the mortgage 
markets. Nevertheless banks were new to this product (since industrial loans were their major 
concern)， so they were not so aware of the credit worthiness of their clients. According to the ex-
perts， they used to grant loans up to 120% of the land value. 
In France， the central Bank did also decrease its interest rate (“taux des appels d'offre")， from 
12.5% in January 1983 to 7% in June 1987. The prime rate decreased accordingly， from 14% in 1981 
to 9.45% in 1988 (on average) ， but the real interest rates jumped from 0.6 to 6.75% during the 
same period (see fig.3) . That is to say that in the case of France， the real-estate boom occ町 edde-
spite the increasing cost of the credit. The French banks were as eager as their Japanese counter-
parts to enlarge their market's shares on the mortgage markets， because of the growing competition 
due to the deregulation process. 
The financial deregulation played the role of “catalyst" of the speculation process， but other 
factors helped the land prices to rise: 
-the strong tax incentives to buy and keep， particularly in Japan : tax incentives for companies 
to balance their accounts by buying land and building office space (tax allowance， until 1990)， in-
centives for owners to avoid the capital gain tax by acquiring real-estate in the suburbs (kaikae 
tokurei， until 19855). Moreover， the land property taxation is not burdensome in both countries， espe-
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Fig.4. Interest rates In Japan from 1980 to 1伺2
cially for the farm land within Tokyo area up to 1992. This factor incites to keep land without us. 
mg lt.
ーthederegulation of planning and construction rules : in Japan， the Prime minister Nakasone 
started in 1983 a new policy called “Minkatsu"， which aimed at developing private investment in 
the construction sector. Minkatsu policy was characterised by an important deregulation of the 
urban planning rules and the sale of public land at a high price. The main purpose of deregulation 
5 The kaikae toku何isystem is a “special tax treatment for residential property replacement". According to this taxation. 
the households who own a property in the centre of a large town and want to move in the suburbs can avoid the huge 
capital gain tax if they buy a new property at the same value (at least) as their former one. 
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was to increase the Floor Area Ratio (F AR， Yoseki rilsu) ， extremely low for a city such as Tokyo 
(the effective F AR was 102% in 19896， that is about one third below the Paris F AR). In France， the 
1985-1986 set of measures7 aimed similarly at helping the construction sector by deregulating the 
urban planning rules. In 1985， the procedure which prevented the developers to build more than 
2000 m2 of office space without a permission (“procedure d'agrement8") was abolished， as weIl as 
the “legal density ceiling" (Plafond legal de densite， PLD) inside Paris in 19879• 
This deregulation policy played a major role in the rise of land prices in both capital cities. 
Sachio OTANI has observed that every 100% increase in density was correlated with an increase of 
2/2.5 miIlion yens/sqmlO in Chiyoda ward. Similarly， the growing flexibility of urban planning tools 
(Iand-use plan， PLD…) provoked a rise of the land prices in Parisl1. 
-the “myth effect" : in Japan， the “land myth" which states that land prices can only go up， is
said to be partly responsible for the abruptness of the “land boom" ; the central government sup-
ported this erroneous belief during the first period of the bubble， by over evaluating greatly the de-
mand of office space in Tokyo12. The extreme scarcity of land in the capital region was another mis-
take. According to a recent study， there are about 400 millions m2 of land (farm land or idle land) 
available for urban use in the capital r巴gion(Tokyo Prefecture and the three adjacent prefectures) 
by the year 2000， where 2.6 to 3.7 million housing units could be b uiIt 13. In Paris， the myth of land 
scarcity also played a role， as weIl as the wrong belief that the Parisian land prices were 
under-evaluated when compared to other European capital cities. 
It must be noticed that despite the severe increase of both commercial and residential land， the 
land and real-estate markets have been particularly active the increase of land transactions in 
Paris 20 wards14 is correlated to the increase of prices (from 70 in 1986 to 236 in 1989， that is 3 
6 NOGUCHI Yukio， 1992.“Nihonωhi ni okeru tochi riyo臼 shakuchi.shakka ho" chapter 6 Saiteki toshi 0 kangaeru， Tokyo 
Daigaku Press， edited by UZA W A Hirofumi and HORJUCHI Kozo，p.134. 
7 Mehaignerie is the name of the French construction minister of that period 
8 This procedure was introduced in 24 cities of the western part of lIe de France (Departement des Hauts de Seine) to 
equilibrate the unbalance between， on one side， the West and the East of Paris， and on the other side， Paris and the 
countryside. 
9 The PLD was introduced in 1975 to discourage high-density schemes by fiscal means that also brought extra re. 
sources to the local council's set Iimits to landowner's development rights. Initialy， the PLD was 1 square meter of 
floor area per square meter of land area and its rate applied to the whole of France， except Paris where it was 1.5. To 
build above this ratio， the owners have to pay a tax. 
10 It means that the price of a plot of land with 1000% FAR is about 2/2.5 million/sqm higher than a plot of land with 
900% F AR. See OT ANI Sachio， 1989， Toshi ni tote削印刷出anani ka， Chikuma library， p.154. 
11 Joseph COMBY， December 1988， Etudes Foncieres n 0 41. 
12 In May 1985， the Kokudocho (National Land Agency) issued出 oficialforecast for office space deamnd in Tokyo， 
from year 1985 to year 2000. The forecasted surface， 5 140 hectares， was over evaluated， and the Kokudocho had to 
lower its estimation down 1600/1900 hectares in 1987 (OT ANI S.，op.cit目p目21).
13NOGUCHI Y.， IGARASHl T.op.cit.p.101. 
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times). As for Tokyo capital region， the number of transactions went up from 440 000 in 1985 to 
520 000 in 1987 ; nevertheless， they dropped to 400 000 in 1988 and remained at the same level dur-
ing the two following years. The construction sector displayed good results in both cities : 13 mil-
lions sqm of office space were built from 1985 to 1991 in Ile-de-France region (that is 45% the 
amount of the previous office stock in 1985 : 29 millions sqm15) ， and 40.7 millions sqm in Tokyo 
Region (40% of the office stock in 1985 : 101.118 millions sqm); the housing sector followed a simi-
lar trend : 25.7% increase of housing starts in Ile de France from 1986 to 1989 (from 48 265 to 60 
686 units) and 49% increase in Tokyo capital region from 1985 to 1987 (from 414 000 to 617 000 
units， see fig. 5 and 6) 
The turning point 
After respectively four years and two years of skyrocketing in Tokyo and in Paris， the land 
prices finally dropped in both cities by the beginning of the 1990's. The last official datas in Japan 
(kij叫jikavalues of July the first 1993， published in September) show a decrease of the land prices 
down to their previous level of 1986-1987 in Tokyo， Osaka and Nagoya regions16. This means that 
(x1000) 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
。
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 191 1992 
• Apartements 口Semi-detachedhouses圃Detach回 houses
Datas : SIROCO/SICLONE 
Fig.5. Housing construction in lIe de France region from 1981 to 1992 
14 There are no datas on land transactions for lle-de-France region. 
15Bertrand DE FEYDEAU， '‘L'investissement immobilier a-t-il encore un avenirγ¥L 'observateur de ['immobilier n 0 23-24， 
May 1993，p.l6. 
16Nihon Keizai Shinbun， the 21th of September 1993. According to this data， the residential land prices dropped re-
spectively 30% and 50% in Tokyo and Osaka prefecture， and the commercial land prices (used for ofice space) de-
creased more severely than last year (-20.5% on average， up to-30% in Shinjuku and Minato wards)ー
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the bubble has partly burst. As for France， the data on land prices are not recent， and stil reveal a 
stand stil position but the rental level of office space has decreased by 25 to 30% on average 
(from 6500 F /sqm/year to 4000/F sqm/year in the prime locations) and the housing prices are 
said to be 30% down from their previous level. 
We can assume that the drastic increase of the interest rates in July 1989 (bank rate rose from 
2.5 to 5% within less than one year) was the main factor for breaki昭 thespeculation movement in 
Japan， but it is likely that the land markets were already weakened by the over heated prices. In 
France， the government did not adopt a monetary policy to stop the speculation process. Neverthe-
less， the real-estate markets finally registered a slump. 
The real-estate sector is undergoing a severe crisis in both countries. The debt of J apanese 
real-estate companies having gone bankruptcy goes from 500 billion yens a year on average during 
the 1980's to 2 900 billion yens in 1991. Not only companies having lately joined the real estate in-
dustry went bankruptcy (Aoyama Building Development for example) ， but also well-known 
real-estate companies， such as Mar時 0，pioneer of the “one room manshon" (one-room apartment) . 
The banking sector was consequently affected : in October 1993，the Bank of Japan estimated to 
14000 billion yens the amount of bad debts of the 21αry banks. According to the experts this figure 
was largely under-evaluated， the actual value could be closer to 40000 billion yens17. In France， 
bad debts were evaluated to 50 billion francs in May 1993 (915 billion yens) ， that accounts for one 
17 According to figures given by Philippe PONS， Le Monde， 3rd of November 1993 
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year trading results of the whole banking sector18. As in Japan， the middle range and foreign banks 
are mostly concerned. But top banks are also affected : the Credit Lyonnais Bank has commited 20 
billion francs in realestate loans (366 billion yens) ， 1ndos田 zBank had to sel a part of its presti-
glOl 
One of the most important feature of the “b山 ble"was the office space oversupply (which 
mainly resulted from the bad effects of the tax system in Japan). Many redevelopment projects had 
to be abandoned in both cities. 1n Paris， the postponement of many ZAC schemes20 is equally pre 
judicial for the future social housing supply. 
The governmental policy 
How did the central government react toward the “bubble" phenomenon in the two countries? 
1n Japan， the government issued an “Outline of Emergency Land Policies" in October 1987. On 
the basis of this document， several measures were taken special governmental hearing on 
real-estate loans provided by the financial institutions (October 1987)， stopping the sale of the 
public land to private developpers (in particular， the land owned by the Japanese National Railway)， 
institution of a “short term capital gain" tax for plots resold within 2 years by companies (October 
1987) ， enlargement of the surveillance district system (Jand transactions involving plots above 100 
or 300 sqm in certain designed areas must be checked by the local authorities) in November 1987， 
limitation of the kaikaeωkurei system to special cases in March 1988. 
Nevertheless， except the reinforcement of the control of land transactions， those measures were 
confined to limit the excessive effects of speculation. The land skyrocketing did therefore foIlow its 
trend. 1t is only in 1989， four years after the land boom started， that significant countermeasures 
were taken : rise of the official discount rate (revised four times from Mai 1989， up to 5.25%) ， and 
“window-guidance" to the banks， exhorting them to limit their mortgage lending (April 1990). 
Yet the interest rates could have been risen two years before， since the economy had recovered 
from endaka as early as November 1986. So why did not the authorities react efficiently? 
According to an official report issued by the Finance ministry21， there is a time lag between the rec-
ognition of economic condtions and theモfJectof policies aimed at dealing ωith them. This vague response is not 
sufficient to explain the governmental “apathy" despite the strong criticism against speculation and 
18Pierre DURIF. L'observateur de ['imobilier n 0 23-24. May 1993，p.2. 
19Francois RENARD， Le Monde， 23 th of April 1992 
20Zone d'Amenagement Concerte， developing zones where a system of cross-subsidisation is implemented by the local 
authority to support the cost of public infrastructure and social housing. 
21Japanese Ministry of Finance， The institute of Fiscal and Monetary Policy， The Mechanism and Economic Eficts qf Aset 
Price fluctuatio町-Ar.抑 rtof the Research Committee， April 1993，p.l2 
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its social consequences. Other reasons can be put forward : the high level of land prices provided a 
higher tax incor配 forthe State (it was particularly the case of the i出 erita町巴 taxand the capital 
gain tax) ， which increased by 53% from 1984 to 19892. Italso allowed the State to balance the 
accounts by selling public land. On the other side， the rise of the land prices stimulated the 
real-estate and the banking sectors where the profits were decreasing in the beginning of the 
1980's. The private developers took greatly advantage of low interest rates and credit facilities， cou-
pled with the minkatsu polにY1町 entives(sale of huge plots of public land and deregulation of F AR). 
This process contributed to develop the domestic demand， as expected by the Maekawa report in 
1986 to balance the loss generated by the strong yen on the exportation markets23. 
By the end of 1989， seven months after the first rise in the interest rates， a new statute was 
adopted by the ] apanese Diet : the “Basic Land Act'¥Although it did not stipulate concrete mea-
sures to cope with the land boom， this act led to rather drastic reforms concerning land and 
real守 estate the Land Tax Reform in December 1990， the Land and Building Lease Reform in 
September 1991. and the Urban Planning Reform in ]une 1992. The general phi1osophy， behind this 
set of status， was to promote urban land supply and to fight against land holding by land owners 
through tax incentives， especially targeted towards so-called “farm land" within urban areas. 
However， those decisions occured too late such a tightening policy is now likely to worsen the 
market's slump. Consequently， even the kaikae tokurei， which had been criticised for having prop苧
agated the price boom in the suburbs， was reintroduced in April 1993 to help the real-estate con-
structlon recover. 
The French government did also take emergency countermeasures two years after the land 
boom started. In October 1989， an “Emergency Action Plan" was adopted in Ile-de-France Region. 
Its content was the re-introduction of the agreement procedure of office space and the institution of 
a new tax annual tax on office space in Paris24. In November 1989， the regulation restricting the 
transformation of housing into office space was tightened. Finally， a new act on city planning， called 
LOV (Loi d'Orientation de la Ville) was enacted in ]uly 1991. It aimed at four main targets : to 
re-establish the social balance within the urban zones， to encourage the input of the population in 
the planning procedure， to take into consideration the housing problem in the local plans， and to 
facilitate intervention of local authorities on land markets by creating public land agencies. A new 
tax on future development projects， called PDH (Participation a la Diversite de I'Habitat) was also 
introduced to promote the diversification within those markets : for every new private development 
program， the local authorities were allowed to levy up to 15 % of the land cost (or a plot of land for 
the same amount) to the benefit of social housing. Needless to say， private developers did not agree 
with this measure. However， the present market's slump reduces the efficiency of its implementa-
22Natacha AVELINE-DUBACH， Bulle 10ηιiere， equilibres macro-economiques et gest問!urbaine au Japon， thをsede Doctorat NR， 
EHESS， 29 th of April 1993， 292p 
23The Maekawa report， issued in 1986， proposed a succession of measures to adjust the ]apanese economy to the new 
international environment. Although it was not oficial， ithad a great impact on the governmental policy. 
24The tax amount is from 15 to 50F/sqm(from 274 to 915 yens/sqm)， dependi時 onthe localisation 
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tlOn. 
This comparison between the French and ]apanese cases shows that neither in France nor in 
]apan was the governmental policy efficient to stop the speculation process. Moreover， the measures 
adopted in both countries have proved to be short-viewed， and not to fit with the present 
real-estate crisis. Some of them are thus likely to be progressively abandonned for the sake of the 
economy at large. In order to go beyond such myopic guidelines， itis urgent to work at a long term 
system regulating the land and property markets. 
152 Comprehensive Urban Studies NO.53 1994 
The Land “Bubble": A Comparison between Tokyo and Paris 
Nata!二haAve1ine * 
*Resercher in Economy， CNRS， Toulouse Le Mirail University 
Comprehesive Urban Studies， No.53， 1994， pp.141-152 
During the second half of the 1980's， both Paris and Tokyo have experienced a huge increase of 
the urban land prices (the socal1ed“land b山ble").This phenomenon showed similar features in 
both capital cities : itwas generated by the deregulation process of the financial markets and the 
development of the service sector. In addition， the deregulation of planning and construction rules， 
the tax incentives to buy and keep real-estate assets， and the myth of land scarcity have helped the 
land prices to rise in both countries. 
Despite the emergency countermeasures adopted by the ]apanese and French governments two 
years after the land boom started， the speculation process lasted until the end of the 1980's. The 
public authorities had than to react more efficiently in 1990 and 1991， more drastic reforms con-
cerning the tax system and the planning rules were adopted. But this measures intervened while the 
real-estate markets were registering a severe slow-down in Paris and Tokyo. The present market's 
slump and the strong pressure of the real-estate and construction companies to deregulate the land 
tax system and the. planning rules are entraving the efficiency of a long term policy to regulate the 
land and property markets. 
